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Thomas Carlyle’s early writings epitomise the critical stance towards the utili-
tarian culture of the age, which Carlyle condemns for glorifying the ‘outward’,
i.e. the physical world of machinery, governed by automaticity and mechanical
principles, at the expense of the ‘inward’, i.e. the spiritual realm of the human in-
dividual, whose hallmarks are instead free volition and agency, and to which au-
tomaticity and mechanical principles are foreign. By the 19tʰ century, however, the
distinction between human and machine was becoming increasingly problematic.
Drawing fromThomas Carlyle’s essays “Signs of the Times” (1829) and “Character-
istics” (1831), and from earlier physiological texts with which they engage—chiefly
David Hartley’s Observations on Man (1749)—, I explore the tension between the
understanding of the human in terms of free will and agency, and the physiologi-
cal evidence that human thought and behaviour are partly automatic. I argue that
the understanding of human nature as partly automatic destabilises Carlyle’s cat-
egories of ‘outward’ and ‘inward’ by disrupting their underlying assumption of
a clear boundary between man and machine based on their functioning (the lat-
ter) or not (the former) according to mechanical principles, entailing instead a
fluid connotation whereby the ‘mechanical’ is defined as much by identification
with the ‘human’ as in opposition to it. I conclude by offering a geometric illustra-
tion of the destabilised inward-outward boundary through the metaphor of non-
orientable surfaces (e.g. Möbius strip and Klein bottle), in which it is impossible to
distinguish an inside and an outside.
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1. The equation
In 1829, British historian and cultural critic Thomas Carlyle wrote:
This condition of the two great departments of knowledge; the outward, cultivated exclu-
sively on mechanical principles—the inward finally abandoned, because, cultivated on
such principles, it is found to yield no results—sufficiently indicates the intellectual bias
of our time, its all-pervading disposition towards that line of enquiry. In fact, an inward
persuasion has long been diffusing itself, and now and then even comes to utterance,
that except the external, there are no true sciences; that to the inward world (if there
be any) our only conceivable road is through the outward; that, in short, what cannot
be investigated and understood mechanically, cannot be investigated and understood at
all.¹
The last point is echoed two years later as: “what he can altogether know and
comprehend, is essentially the mechanical”².
Excerpted from Carlyle’s two early essays, respectively “Signs of the Times”
(1829) and “Characteristics” (1831)—both originally published anonymously in
the Edinburgh Review, and both purporting to be literary reviews themselves³—
these passages parade Carlyle’s diffidence towards a perceived “intellectual
bias” of an age which “practises the great art of adapting means to ends”⁴, and
to which both essays at large move an excoriating critique. Anticipating later
¹ [Thomas Carlyle], “Signs of the Times”,The Edinburgh Review 49, no. 98 (June 1829), 439-59 (446-
47).
² [Thomas Carlyle], “Characteristics”, The Edinburgh Review 54 (December 1831), 351-83 (353).
³ The former of Rev. Edward Irving’s Anticipation, The Rise, Progress, and Present State of Public
Opinion in Great Britain, and The Last Days (London, 1829); the latter of Thomas Hope’s An Es-
say on the Origin and Prospects of Man (London, 1831) and Friedrich von Schlegel’s Philosophische
Vorlesungen (Dresden, 1828).
⁴ [Carlyle], “Signs of the Times”, 441-42.
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major critical voices against utilitarianism—e.g. Matthew Arnold’s attack on
middle-class philistinism¹, and John H. Newman’s denunciation of the univer-
sity as an increasingly professionalising venue, as opposed to an institution
promoting education for its own sake²,—Carlyle censures the utilitarian em-
phasis on technology and mechanisation, preconising instead a shift in focus
towards the human individual and its intellectual and spiritual development.
Carlyle’s condemnation of utilitarianism, however, is framed in a language that
seems to reveal an understanding of reality not fundamentally dissimilar to the
one underlying utilitarian positions: one in which the “mechanical” functions
as the distinguishing feature between the “outward” and the “inward”, where
the former is equated with the physical world of machinery, governed by auto-
maticity andmechanical principles, and therefore suitable to be studied, known,
and comprehended; the latter with the spiritual realm of the human individual,
whose hallmarks are instead arbitrary processes of free volition and agency,
and to which automaticity and mechanical principles are supposedly foreign,
making it inaccessible to investigation and understanding.
Alongside the excerpt quoted above, several other instances in Carlyle’s two
essays assume equivalence between the mechanical, and the outward, visible,
material. The “skill in Mechanism” is defined as the skill of managing “external
things”³, and men are said to have “lost their belief in the Invisible, and believe,
and hope, and work only in the Visible”.⁴ The link between the mechanical and
the visible ismediated by the physical nature of thematerial world—“the science
of the age (…) is physical (…), and, in all shapes, mechanical”⁵; “We are Giants
in physical power”⁶; “This faith in Mechanism, in the all-importance of physical
things”⁷—, to which Carlyle juxtaposes the (in his view regrettably increasingly
neglected) metaphysical, spiritual realm: “From Locke’s time downwards, our
¹ See Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism (London and Cambridge: MacMillan and Co., 1865);
and Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (originally published in Cornhill Magazine, 1867/1868)
(London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1869).
² John H. Newman, The Idea of a University: Defined and Illustrated in Nine Discourses Delivered to
the Catholics of Dublin (delivered 1852), fifth edn (London: Pickering and Co., 1881).
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whole Metaphysics have been physical; not a spiritual Philosophy, but a mate-
rial one”¹; “It is no longer the moral, religious, spiritual condition of the people
that is our concern, but their physical, practical, economical condition”²; and
again: “the Metaphysical and Moral Sciences are falling into decay, while the
Physical are engrossing, every day, more respect and attention”.³ Carlyle’s de-
nunciation that “only the material (…) is important to us”⁴ extends to beauty
and truth, which he views as having been displaced by “some brutal image of
Strength (…) [whereby] We praise a work, not as ‘true’, but as ‘strong’; [as
having] ‘affected’ us.”⁵ Likewise, spiritual and moral pursuits have given way
to physical pursuits, i.e. “tangible, material considerations [about] Profit [and]
Power”.⁶
Beside their scathing overtones⁷, all these instances seem to indicate that
whilst the outward, external, material world functions mechanically (i.e. ac-
cording tomechanical principles, akin tomachinery), the inward, spiritual world
of the human individual does not. In other words, there seems to be an implicit
assumption whereby Carlyle’s category of the mechanical does not apply to the
sphere of the human. My argument here is that, if it is real, Carlyle’s assump-
tion of equivalence between mechanical and outward, and, by implication, of
non-applicability of mechanical principles to the human, is—and by Carlyle’s
time had already become—problematic.
I will advance my argument by first presenting evidence that challenges the
equation of the mechanical with the outer, physical world of machinery, in op-
position to the inner, spiritual realm of the human, along various axes; then by







⁷ Discussing Carlyle’s critique of utilitarianism is beyond the scope of this study.
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2. The challenges
The crux of the matter is whether the mechanical can plausibly be taken as
a hallmark of the physical automatic world of machinery, as opposed to the
immaterial arbitrary world of human thought and behaviour; in other words,
whether, as Carlyle seems to imply, the border between the mechanical and the
non-mechanical aligns itself and is coextensive with the border between the
machine and the human. I suggest it is not.
An intuitively safe distinguishing marker of the human from the machine is
the ability to reflect upon one’s self and exert volition through deliberate inten-
tion and action, as opposed to deterministic automatisms. Although the notion
of consciousness and volition as human indicators—as opposed to automatic-
ity and determinism as defining machinery—is consistent with the Cartesian
outlook, it is not necessarily universally applicable, and must therefore be his-
toricised. By Carlyle’s time, for example, drawing the distinction between hu-
man and machine along the axis of consciousness and volition was beginning
to pose challenges.
One reason why the distinction between human and machine must be his-
toricised is that it would be problematic to assume that machinery was neces-
sarily understood as lacking freedom and agency, as machines have not always
been associated with automaticity and involuntariness. In the early 19ᵗʰ cen-
tury, for example, the rise of industrialisation had brought about speculations
about the possibility that machines might develop consciousness and agency.
Industrial machines were in fact often described as possessing life-like quali-
ties and exerting agency through controlling, dominating, and alienating the
factory worker.¹ A few years after Carlyle’s early essays were published, nov-
elist and critic Samuel Butler observed that “[d]ay by day, (…) the machines
¹ See, for example, the representation of monstrous machinery in the factory chapters of Marx’s
Kapital.
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are gaining ground upon us; (…) we are becoming more subservient to them;
(…) bound down as slaves to tend them”¹, and imagined that machines might
eventually develop consciousness by Darwinian selection, and be able to repro-
duce and evolve as a species, and impose themselves as the superior race—“[i]n
the course of ages we shall find ourselves the inferior race”²—leading to the
dystopian prediction that “the time will come when the machines will hold the
real supremacy over the world and its inhabitants”.³
A second reason why the distinction between man and machine based on
volition ought to be historicised and problematised is that eighteenth- and 19ᵗʰ-
century progress in physiology had made it increasingly clear that the func-
tioning of the human body and mind includes partly automatic mechanisms.
At about the time Carlyle published his second early essay, Scottish neurolo-
gist Charles Bell, who first articulated the difference between sensory and mo-
tor nerves⁴, characterised breathing (in animals with a spinal cord) in terms of
“animal machine with alternate dilatation and contraction”.⁵ Three years later,
English physiologist Marshall Hall advanced his theory of reflex, where action
is shown under conditions of no sensation and no volition.⁶The idea that human
action may be triggered independently of sensory perception or voluntary mo-
tion⁷—hence unconsciously, automatically—presages Darwin’s seemingly oxy-
moronic notion of “machinery of life”.⁸
¹ [Samuel Butler] (under pseudonym Cellarius), “Darwin Among the Machines”, The Press,
Christchurch, New Zealand, 13 June 1863, 184.
² Ibid., 182.
³ Ibid., 185.
⁴ “Each lateral portion of the spinal marrow contains three tracts or columns: one for voluntary
motion, one for sensation, and one for the act of respiration”. Charles Bell, The Nervous System of
the Human Body (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1830), 23.
⁵ Ibid., 25.
⁶ “[W]hen the head is removed from the body, sensation and volition cease, whilst the reflex func-
tion (…) alone continue[s]”. Marshall Hall, “On the Reflex Function of the Medulla Oblongata and
Medulla Spinalis”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 123 (June 1833), 635-65
(663).
⁷ “It is distinctly proved, by this series of observations, that the reflex function exists in the medulla
independently of the brain; in the medulla oblongata independently of the medulla spinalis; and in
the spinal marrow of the anterior extremities, of the posterior extremities, and of the tail, indepen-
dently of that of each other of these parts, respectively”. Ibid., 650.
⁸ Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species (London: John Murray, 1859), 83.
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Consciousness and the will were subjects of much consideration within the
19ᵗʰ-century discourse, during a period that was engaged in scientific investi-
gation and reassessment of these concepts at large.¹ Carlyle himself explicitly
refers to the “deep questions” that the “curious relations of the Voluntary and
Conscious to the Involuntary and Unconscious” raised within psychology and
physiology.² And yet, the relation to consciousness and the will proves to be
an especially moot point in Carlyle’s essays, where the mechanical is first (in
1829) taken to be inanimate³, then (in 1831) pronounced vital⁴ and conscious⁵,
but also implicitly held as non-vital.⁶ This apparent inconsistency between and
within the two essays is crucial for my argument because it suggests that the
mechanical is and was (in Carlyle’s time) not a reliable criterion for establishing
the boundary between man and machine.
By the second half of the 19ᵗʰ centuryAmerican philosopher and psychologist
William James had made it clear that:
Ninety-nine hundredths or, possibly, nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of our
activity is purely automatic and habitual, (…) so fixed by repetition as almost to be
classed as reflex actions. To each sort of impression we have an automatic, ready-made
response.⁷
¹ See works by George Eliot and George Henry Lewes.
² [Carlyle], “Characteristics”, 358.
³ “the living artisan is driven from his workshop, to make room for a speedier, inanimate one”.
[Carlyle], “Signs of the Times”, 442.
⁴ “in all vital things, men distinguish an Artificial and a Natural (…): the Artificial is the (…) me-
chanical”. [Carlyle], “Characteristics”, 361.
⁵ “the man of logic (…) his whole force is mechanical, conscious”. Ibid., 355.
⁶ “what is mechanical lies open us; not what is dynamical and has vitality”. Ibid., 354.
⁷ William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology: And to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals (New
York, NY: Henry Holt, 1899), 65-66.
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Challenging the conventional causal understanding of thought as producing
action, James also theorised that thought may result from action, as opposed to
causing it. According to the James-Lange theory, emotional thoughts, for exam-
ple, are caused by physiological autonomic (i.e. automatic) bodily responses—
and not the other way around, as expressed in the seemingly counterintuitive
claim that “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid be-
cause we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry,
angry, or fearful”.¹
Political commentators incorporated the physiological notions of reverse causal-
ity between thought and action in their criticism. Walter Bagehot, for example,
observed that “no man can argue on his knees [as] The same superstitious feel-
ing which keeps him in that physical attitude will keep him in a corresponding
mental attitude”.² Likewise, political and cultural critics embraced the physio-
logical notion of habit: “It is the dull traditional habit of mankind that guides
most men’s actions”—notes Bagehot—as men are moved “as much by what they
are used to as by what they choose”.³ Carlyle appears to have been aware of the
power of habit and automaticity on action and thought over fifty years before
James put his name on it⁴, when he observed that “Men are grown mechanical
in head and in heart, as well as in hand”.⁵ Likewise, Carlyle’s stance in both
early essays was heavily influenced by eighteenth-century science.
Indeed, the 19ᵗʰ-century advances in the understanding of human physiol-
ogy owed their momentum to 18ᵗʰ-century insights on the nature of the hu-
¹ William James, “What is an Emotion?”, Mind 34 (1884), 188-205 (190).
² Walter Bagehot,The English Constitution (reprinted from the Fortnightly Review) (London: Chap-
man and Hall, 1867), 108.
³ Ibid., 10.
⁴ “the same habit regulates, not our modes of action alone, but our modes of thought and feeling”.
[Carlyle], “Signs of the Times”, 444. See also “Opinion is at all times doubly related to Action, first
as cause, then as effect” (446).
⁵ Ibid., 444.
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man body and behaviour. About a century before Carlyle’s proclamation of the
need to rescue the human from themachine, English philosopher David Hartley
had published his Observations on Man (1749)¹, where he had applied Newto-
nian science to human morality. Likening the human person to a “mechanism”
amenable to scientific study, Hartley had sought to develop a “science of man”
based on the assumption that the body’s “component Particles” are “subjected
to the same subtle Laws” (i.e. the Newtonian laws) as are all other material
entities.² Through his “Doctrines of Vibrations and Association”³—the former
inspired by Newton, the latter by Locke⁴—, Hartley had examined morality and
religion in terms of their consequences and physical causes.⁵ Remarkably, Hart-
ley ushered in the prospect that the will itself may be mechanical⁶, as, like ev-
ery other human action, “results from the previous Circumstances of Body and
Mind (…) as other Effects do from their Mechanical Causes”.⁷ Importantly, the
will, in Hartley’s view, is mechanical but not automatic.⁸
Hartley distinguishes betweenmechanical and automatic, positing that some-
thing mechanical may be either automatic (depending upon sensation) or vol-
untary (depending upon ideas).⁹ Accordingly, human action, which is mechan-
ical, may be automatic or voluntary.¹⁰ The distinction is notable because, con-
¹ David Hartley,Observations onMan, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations (London: Printed by
S. Richardson for James Leake and Wm. Frederick, 1749)—an integrated account the human being
in terms of neurology (i.e. man’s “frame”), moral psychology (i.e. man’s “duty”), and spirituality
(i.e. man’s “expectations”).
² Hartley, Observations on Man, 62.
³ Ibid., 5.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., v and 81.
⁶ “all human Actions proceed from Vibrations in the Nerves of the Muscles, and these from others,
which are (…) of a mechanical Nature. (…) Since (…) all Desire and Aversion, are (…) generated by
Association; i.e. mechanically; it follows that the Will is mechanical also”. Ibid., 503.
⁷ Ibid., 500.
⁸ “TheWill appears to be nothing but a Desire or Aversion sufficiently strong to produce an Action
that is not automatic”. Ibid., 371.
⁹ “Of the two Sorts of Motion, viz. automatic and voluntary, the first depends upon Sensation, the
last upon Ideas”. Ibid., 85.
¹⁰ “The Motions of the Body are of two kinds, automatic and voluntary”. Ibid., iii. “The automatic
Motions are those which arise from the Mechanism of the Body (…) They are called automatic, for
their Resemblance to the Motions of Automata, or Machines, whose Principle of Motion is within
themselves”. Ibid., iii.
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trary to the Cartesian account of “mechanism” as the distinguishing attribute of
(non-human) animals, it acknowledges the presence of a non-voluntary aspect
within the human person as well. More importantly, Hartley recognises that
automaticity applies not only to bodily movements which are automatic in na-
ture (e.g. “the Motions of the Heart, and the peristaltic Motion of the Bowels”¹—
movements which cannot be performed at will), but also to actions which are
voluntary in nature (e.g. “Walking, Handling, Speaking”—all potentially con-
trollable by the will), when they are not “attended to, and performed with an
express Design”.² Crucially, in order to perform a voluntary action without at-
tending to it, one has to have gained full command over it.³ This makes auto-
maticity an achievement—not a given. Habits imply the will, as they arise as a
result of repetition of willed actions.
This notion of habit as acquired through the will paves the way for the pos-
sibility of a direct connection between morality and physiology, as (moral) ac-
tions leave a physiological footprint whichmay be scientifically studied. French
physiologist and philosopher Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis proposed this theory
in his influential treatise Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme (1802),
where he sought to establish a unified “science of man”⁴, based on the argument
that the study of man’s physical nature produces insight into man’s moral char-
acter as well⁵, as moral considerations may “borrow the lights from the study
of physical phenomena”.⁶ Cabanis supports his stance by pointing out that his-
torically the wisest men cultivated the study of health and disease⁷, and the
most successful philosophers tended to be well versed in physiology⁸: Pythago-
¹ Ibid., iv.
² Ibid.
³ Hartley illustrates this point through the example of a child gradually learning to exert control
over her actions, until she eventually can perform them without conscious volition.
⁴ “la physiologie, l’analyse des idées et la morale, ne sont que les trois branches d’une seule et
même science, qui peut s’appeler (…) la science de l’homme”. P[ierre] J[ean] G[eorges] Cabanis,
Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, in 2 vols (Paris: Crapart, Caille, and Ravier, 1802; 2ⁿᵈ
ed. 1805), 7.
⁵ “L’étude de l’homme physique est également intéressante pour le médecin et pour le moraliste”.
Ibid., vii.
⁶ “S’il est ici question de considérations morales, c’est par rapport aux lumières qu’elles peuvent
emprunter de l’étude des phénomènes physiques”. Ibid., xxxviii.
⁷ “les hommes qui cultivoient la sagesse (…) étudioient l’homme sain et malade”. Ibid., 11.
⁸ “la philosophie rationnelle (…) les hommes qui l’ont cultivée avec le plus de succès, étoient
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ras¹, Democritus², Hippocrates³, Aristotle⁴, and, more recently, Descartes⁵, and
Locke⁶, have all, each in their own way, understood the tight relation between
man’s physical and moral qualities, as well as the fruitfulness of studying them
holistically.
The idea that there be a direct connection between morality and physiology
was to find resonance in 19ᵗʰ-century political theory: “it is the action of the will
that causes the unconscious habit; it is the continual effort of the beginning
that creates the hoarded energy of the end; (…) Here physical causes do not
create the moral, but moral create the physical”.⁷ Bagehot’s observations exalt
the will by celebrating its absence (the will achieves its goal precisely when it
is no longer needed, and habits can take over), and, in the parallel between the
“action of the will” and the “silent toil” transmitted across generations, will and
habit become the bridge between physiology and politics. The reason why “an
old constitution like that of England” works well, and “yesterday’s institutions
are by far the best for to-day (…) the most ready, the most influential, the most
easy to get obeyed”⁸, can therefore be traced back to physiological mechanisms:
man’s natural inclination towards “sleepy” and “dull” habits.⁹
Carlyle refers to Hartley’s and Cabanis’s work with disparaging mockery:
nobody now cares about (…) Hartley’s, Darwin’s, or Priestley’s contemporaneous do-
ings in England. Hartley’s vibrations and vibratiuncles one would think were material
and mechanical enough; but our continental neighbours have gone still farther. One of
presque tous versés dans la physiologie”. Ibid., 10.
¹ “[Pythagore] voulut soumettre les phénomènes de la vie à des formules mécaniques”. Ibid., 16.
² “Démocrite paroît avoir senti mieux encore les étroites connexions de l’état physique et de l’état
moral”. Ibid., 22.
³ “[L]a médecine et la philosophie, fondues ensemble dans ses écrits, y sont absolument insépara-
bles”. Ibid.
⁴ “[C]’est dans l’étude des faits physiques, qu’Aristote avoit (…) puisé (…) sa métaphysique et sa
morale.” Ibid., 32.
⁵ “[Descartes] passa une partie de sa vie à disséquer. Il croyoit que le secret de la pensée étoit caché
dans l’organisation des nerfs et du cerveau”. Ibid., 36.
⁶ “Locke étoit médecin; et c’est par l’étude de l’homme physique, qu’il avait préludé à ses décou-
vertes dans la métaphysique, la morale et l’art social”. Ibid., 38.
⁷ Walter Bagehot, Physics and politics (New York, NY: D. Appleton, 1873), p. 11.
⁸ Bagehot, The English constitution, 10.
⁹ Ibid.
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their philosophers has lately discovered, that “as the liver secretes bile, so does the brain
secrete thought”; which astonishing discovery Dr Cahanis [sic], more lately still, in his
Rapports du Physique et du Morale de l’Homme, has pushed into minutest developements
[sic].¹ The metaphysical philosophy of this last enquirer is certainly no shadowy or un-
substantial one. He fairly lays open our moral structure with his dissecting knives and
real metal probes; and exhibits it to the inspection of mankind (…). We have the greatest
admiration for this learned doctor: with what scientific stoicism he walks through the
land of wonders, unwondering (…).”²
Much of the work that Carlyle so ridicules, however, left its mark on him.
Echoes of Hartley’s argument that the mechanical nature of the human body
and mind renders them suitable for scientific investigation³ appear in Carlyle’s
critique of the “intellectual bias of our time”, according to which only what
can be studied and understood mechanically can be studied and understood
at all.⁴ Similarly, Hartley’s theory of the body as mechanical system endowed
with an inherent natural tendency to heal itself⁵ resonates in Carlyle’s view of
health as an inherently automatic and unconscious state⁶: “the sign of health is
Unconsciousness”⁷; “The healthy know not their health, but only the sick”.⁸ And
¹ Cf. “la pensée, qui se produit dans le cerveau, ne sauroit exister quand cet organe manque”, and:
“Pour se faire une idée juste des opérations dont résulte la pensée, il faut considérer le cerveau
comme un organe particulier, destiné spécialement à la produire; de même que l’estomac et les
intestins à opérer la digestion, le foie à filtrer la bile”; as well as: “Nous concluons (…) que le cerveau
digère en quelque sorte les impressions; qu’il fait organiquement la sécrétion de la pensée”. Cabanis,
Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, 152, 152-53, and 154, respectively.
² [Carlyle], “Signs of the Times”, 446.
³ “And all the Evidences for the mechanical Nature of the Body or Mind are so many Encourage-
ments to study them faithfully and diligently, since what is mechanical may both be understood
and remedied”. Hartley, Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations, 267.
⁴ [Carlyle], “Signs of the Times”, 446-47.
⁵ “[A]ll the natural Functions tend to theWelfare of the Body, so there is a remarkable Tendency in
all Disorders of the Body to rectify themselves”. Hartley, Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty,
and his Expectations, 266. These tendencies are subject to the “Laws of Mechanism”, as they show
the “Traces of Mechanism” (267).
⁶ “In the Body (…) the first condition complete health is, that each organ perform its function
unconsciously”. [Carlyle], “Characteristics”, 352.
⁷ Ibid., 354.
⁸ Ibid., 351.
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although Cabanis’s claim that the moral is “nothing else than the physical”¹ is
something which Carlyle may have found hard to swallow, Cabanis’s view of
man as a “living machine”² seems to live on in Carlyle’s account of the “vital
action” as unconscious mechanism.³ Hence, like Hartley and Cabanis before
him, and James after him, Carlyle thinks highly of the unconscious—be it in
performance⁴, in judgement⁵, in private conduct⁶, in politics⁷, or in morality.⁸
From a biological perspective, this extension of the notion of unconscious
automaticity to include a large range of human behaviour is radical in that
it narrows the gap between human and (non-human) animal as well as be-
tween (human and non-human) animal and machinery. From a philosophical
perspective, it is even more radical, because it dignifies automaticity by raising
it above voluntariness. Hence not only is man partly automatic, but the auto-
matic side may be superior (in the sense of more advanced) to the voluntary
one, an idea that seems to foreshadow Darwin’s notion of “unconscious selec-
tion”.⁹ Taken farther, this line of argument led to James’s quasi-rejection of the
non-automatic: “a man’s conscious wit and will (…) are aiming at something
¹ “[L]e moral n’est que le physique”. Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, 39-40.
² A “machine vivante”. Ibid., 141.
³ “[S]uch is still the wish Nature on our behalf; in all vital action, her manifest purpose and effort
is, that we should be unconscious of it, (…) For indeed vital action (…) is (…) a means, not an end;
[it is] on the result, that Nature (…) is wont to intrust us with insight and volition. Boundless as
is the domain of man, it is but a small fractional proportion of it that he rules with Consciousness
and by Forethought”. [Carlyle], “Characteristics”, 353.
⁴ “[A]lways the characteristic of a right performance is a certain spontaneity, an unconsciousness”.
Ibid., 356.
⁵ “Of the Wrong we are always conscious, of the Right never”. Ibid.
⁶ “The good man is he (…) to whom well-doing is as his natural existence, awakening no astonish-
ment, (…) like a thing of course (…). Self-contemplation, on the other hand, is infallibly the symptom
of disease”. Ibid.
⁷ “[I]n the Body Politic, as in the animal body, the sign of right performance is Unconsciousness”.
Ibid., 361.
⁸ “If in any sphere of Man’s Life, then in the moral sphere, as the inmost and most vital of all, it is
good that there be wholeness; that there be unconsciousness, which is the evidence of this”. Ibid.,
357. See also “Thus is true Moral genius (…) ever a secret to itself” (358).
⁹ Discussing “unconscious selection”, Darwin notes that whereas “[m]an can act only on external
and visible characters: nature cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as they may be useful
to any being”. Darwin, On the Origin of Species, 34-37, and 83, respectively. Cf. Carlyle’s notion of
outward, external, visible world as the only domain suited for investigation and comprehension.
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only dimly and inaccurately imagined. Yet […] his conscious strainings are let-
ting loose subconscious allies”, and it is they, which, in James’s view, are better
suited to reach the aimed ideal.¹ Thus the will is necessary and valuable, but it
is unable to reach beyond what Arnold would call the “ordinary self”. Only the
unconscious (i.e. the automatic, the mechanical) may access the “best self”. In
James’s physiological terms this translates as “[l]et one do all in one’s power,
and one’s nervous system will do the rest”.²
Taken together, these considerations suggest that it would be problematic to
assume a simple direct correspondence between the mechanical and the mate-
rial world of machinery, and between the human and consciousness, agency,
and the will. The various lines of evidence of unconscious automaticity in hu-
man behaviour point to a misalignment between the axes mechanical-non-
mechanical and machine-human, because they indicate that the mechanical
cannot be assumed to only apply to or be indicative of machinery.
3. The equation, redux
Earlier in the 1829 essay, Carlyle muses:
Were we required to characterise this age of ours by any single epithet, we should be
tempted to call it (…) the Mechanical Age. It is the Age of Machinery. (…) There is no
end to machinery.³
My aim here has been to zoom in on the concepts of mechanical and ma-
chinery as presented in Carlyle’s early essays, and examine ways in which they
¹ William James, Varieties of Religious Experience (New York, NY: Longmans, 1902), lecture IX.
² Ibid.
³ [Carlyle], “Signs of the Times”, 441-42.
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intersected with new perspectives on mechanisation in a newly industrialised
culture, as well as with the physiological understanding of human thought and
actions as partly automatic. In his analysis of “the two great departments of
knowledge”, Carlyle seems to view the mechanical as the distinguishing feature
between the machine and the human, as suggested by the equation opposing
the “outward”, conceived of as operating according to mechanical principles,
and the “inward”, conceived of as operating according to non-mechanical pro-
cesses. Here I have suggested that this equation of outer with mechanical, and
inner with non-mechanical is trans-historically and trans-disciplinarily unsta-
ble. Similar to the connotation of the mechanical in Carlyle’s essays, which
morphs from actual to metaphorical machine(ry)¹, gradually moving beyond
the outward to increasingly invest the inward², the 19ᵗʰ-century understanding
of the relation between human andmachine changed with the rise of industrial-
isation and ensuing new perspectives onmechanisation andmachine agency, as
well as with advances in physiology and resulting discovery of automatic mech-
anisms governing the human body and behaviour. Whilst 19ᵗʰ-century British
culture championed the value of individual freedom, 19ᵗʰ-century physiology
increasingly coalesced around the idea that man is not free, but rather operates
according to automatic mechanisms. As automaticity gained admittance into
the understanding of human action and thought, a conceptual reconfiguration
of the relation between man and machine ensued: the upshot being that man
too, after all, is a machine.
Hence, in contrast to Carlyle’s (and contemporaries’) early idea of the me-
chanical as the distinguishing feature between the “outward”—i.e. the physical
world of machinery, governed by automaticity andmechanical principles—, and
the “inward”—i.e. the spiritual domain of the human individual, governed by vo-
¹ See, for example, “we havemachines for Education (…).Then, we have Religiousmachines (…) the
Bible Society, professing a far higher and heavenly structure, is found, on enquiry, to be altogether
an earthly contrivance (…) a very excellent machine for converting the heathen. (…) No individual
now hopes to accomplish the poorest enterprise single-handed, and without mechanical aids; (…)
In these days (…) ‘to live, signifies to unite with a party, or to make one’. Philosophy, Science, Art,
Literature, all depend on machinery”. [Carlyle], “Signs of the Times”, 443. See also “Machine of
Society” (447).
² See “let us observe how the mechanical genius of our time has diffused itself into quite other
provinces. Not the external and physical alone is now managed by machinery, but the internal and
spiritual also”. [Carlyle], “Signs of the Times”, 442.
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lition and agency, the message emerging from 19ᵗʰ-century advances in mech-
anisation and physiology is that the mechanical is not necessarily automatic,
and the human is not necessarily volitional. Rather, the mechanical inhabits a
hybrid space vacillating between the external and the internal, the material and
the spiritual, the volitional and the automatic, and, ultimately, the human and
machinery.
4. Geometric coda
Therefore, unlike what the opening equation seems to imply, the border be-
tween the mechanical and the non-mechanical is neither aligned nor coexten-
sive with the borders between the outside and the inside, the automatic and the
volitional, and, ultimately, the machine and the human. Instead, by articulating
the tension between the understanding of the human as partly free volitional
agent, partly deterministic automatic machinery, the discourse emerging from
Carlyle’s two early essays and the physiological texts with which they engage
results in an ambivalent notion whereby the mechanical hovers above both the
inward and the outward, unable to serve as the criterion to discriminate be-
tween the two.
In differential geometry, a non-orientable surface is one in which it is im-
possible to define or distinguish an inside and an outside.¹ The Möbius strip²
and the Klein bottle³,—both devised in the latter half of the 19ᵗʰ century, hence
coeval with the discourse of the mechanical—are exemplars of non-orientable
surfaces with no identifiable inner and outer sides.⁴ Transposing the concept of
non-orientability from geometry to the mechanical discourse as articulated in
¹ Thomas Banchoff, Stephen Lovett, Differential Geometry of Curves and Surfaces (Natick, MA: A.
K. Peters, 2010), p. 138.
² August Ferdinand Möbius, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 2, ed. by F. Klein (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1886). The
strip is discussed on p. 19-20. Möbius however did not publish his discovery during his lifetime.
The strip was also discovered independently by Johann Benedict Listing in the same year (1858).
³ Felix Klein, “Bemerkungen über den Zusammenhang der Flächen”, Mathematische Annalen 7
(1874), 549-57.
⁴ Alfred Gray, Elsa Abbena, Simon Salamon, “Nonorientable Surfaces”, in Modern Differential Ge-
ometry of Curves and Surfaces with Mathematica, 3ʳᵈ ed. (Boca Raton, FL: Chapman and Hall / CRC,
2006), 331-51.
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the examined texts by Carlyle and interlocutors, it is possible to visualise the
fluid connotation of the notion of mechanical: like the geometric structure of
a non-orientable surface, which makes it impossible to discriminate the inside
from the outside, the understanding of human nature as partly deterministic
and automatic destabilises Carlyle’s categories of ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ as
defined by their (purportedly) functioning (the latter) or not (the former) ac-
cording to mechanical principles; like a non-orientable surface, the mechanical
partakes of the inward as much as of the outward. The non-orientability of the
mechanical, therefore, ultimately disrupts the conceptual boundary between
man and machine, as it yields a notion of machine which is defined as much by
identification with the human, as in opposition to it.
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